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In this paper, I will make several specific suggestions concerning the concept of 
happiness. First, I will suggest that the conceptual structure of happiness/joy can 
be usefully described in terms of four cognitive components: conceptual metaphors, 
conceptual metonymies, related concepts, and cognitive/cultural models. Second, 
I will claim that the concept of happiness/joy shares a number of force-dynamically 
constituted metaphorical source domains with emotion concepts in general. Third, I 
will propose that happiness/joy and emotion concepts in general are characterised 
by what I call evaluative and phenomenological metaphors. Fourth, I will propound 
that  phenomenological metaphors are based on distinctive causes and expressive, 
physiological and behavioural responses that characterise happiness. Fifth, I 
will argue that a top-down approach can provide us with a fairly detailed though 
very tentative overall cognitive structure for concepts, but, at the same time, I will 
also argue that a top-down approach needs to be supplemented by a bottom-up 
approach.
My chief goal in this paper is to answer the following question: How is the concept of 
happiness structured? Based on my previous work on emotion concepts in general 
and happiness in particular, I will make a specific proposal concerning this issue. 
I will proceed as follows. First, I will provide a very short characterisation of the 
approach to concepts that I will employ in this study; second, I will briefly describe 
the conceptual structure of emotion concepts in general; third, I will outline the 
structure of happiness/joy; and fourth, I will draw some tentative conclusions based 
on my findings.
Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Concepts
We can approach concepts in essentially two ways: “bottom-up” and “top-down.” 
Top-down approaches to concepts find certain language data, make particular 
generalisations given that data, and suggest global cognitive structures (such 
as conceptual metaphors) that underlie and explain the data. This is what many 
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cognitive linguists in the tradition of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have customarily 
done in their work. By contrast, bottom-up researchers begin with an extensive 
(not selective) set of data, make minimal generalisations about the data, and are 
much less in the business of suggesting global cognitive structures that account 
for the data (see, e.g., Dobrovolskij and Piirainen 2005). Cognitive linguists in the 
tradition of Lakoff and Johnson emphasise the importance of global cognitive 
structures, while bottom-up researchers lay stress on finding much less general 
and global conceptual machinery that is needed to account for the total meaning 
of each and every individual linguistic expression relating to a particular domain 
(such as that of emotion) and whose meaning could not be explained with the help 
of global cognitive structures alone. In other words, there is a problem with both 
approaches: Figuratively speaking, top-down researchers do not see the trees 
for the forest, and bottom-up researchers do not see the forest for the trees. In 
this paper, I will knowingly commit the former mistake, in that I will be primarily 
concerned with global cognitive structures on the basis of an incomplete set of 
language data. (On the debate between proponents of the two approaches, see, 
for example, Stefanowitsch 2007 and Kövecses forthcoming.) 
The Conceptual Structure of Emotion Concepts
In my previous research on emotion concepts, I have found that emotion concepts 
are composed of four distinct conceptual ingredients: conceptual metaphors, 
conceptual metonymies, related concepts, and cognitive models (see Kövecses 
1986; 1988; 1990; 2000). My suggestion in all this work was that the conceptual 
metaphors, conceptual metonymies, and related concepts constitute the cognitive 
models. It is the cognitive models that we assume to be the conceptual representation 
of particular emotions, such as anger, love, fear, happiness, etc. Let us now look at 
some representative examples for each of these.
Conceptual Metaphors
By conceptual metaphor I mean a set of correspondences between a more physical 
source domain and a more abstract target domain (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 
and Kövecses 2002). 
Some of the most typical conceptual metaphors that characterise emotions 
include the following:
emotion is a fluid in a container
emotion is heat/fire
emotion is a natural force
emotion is a physical force
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emotion is a social superior
emotion is an opponent
emotion is a captive animal
emotion is a force dislocating the self
emotion is a burden
The overall claim concerning such conceptual metaphors was that they are 
instantiations of a general force-dynamic pattern (see Kövecses 2000), in the sense in 
which this was outlined by Leonard Talmy (1988). Given the force-dynamic character 
of these conceptual metaphors and given that they can be said to make up a large 
part of the conceptual structure associated with the emotions, it can be suggested 
that emotion concepts are largely force-dynamically constituted (Kövecses 2000).
Conceptual Metonymies
Conceptual metonymies can be of two general types: cause of emotion for the 
emotion and effect of emotion for the emotion, with the latter being much more 
common than the former. (On metonymy in the cognitive linguistic view, see 
Barcelona 2000 and Panther and Radden 1999.) Below are some representative 
specific-level cases of the general metonymy effect of emotion for the emotion:
body heat for anger
drop in body temperature for fear
chest out for pride
running away for fear
ways of looking for love
facial expression for sadness
These specific types of conceptual metonymies correspond to physiological, 
behavioural, and expressive responses associated with particular emotions. 
Thus, body heat for anger and drop in body temperature for fear are conceptual 
representations of physiological responses, chest out for pride and running away 
for fear are those of behavioural responses, and ways of looking for love and 
facial expression for sadness are those of expressive responses.
Related Concepts
What I call related concepts are emotions or attitudes that the subject of emotion has 
in relation to the object or cause of emotion. For example, friendship is an emotion 
or emotional attitude that the subject of love prototypically has toward the beloved. 
If someone says that he or she is in love with someone, we can legitimately expect 
the subject of love to also exhibit the emotional attitude of friendship toward the 
beloved. In this sense, friendship is a concept inherent in the concept of romantic 
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love. (Related concepts display different degrees of relatedness—inherent concepts 
are most closely related to a particular concept.)
It can be suggested that such inherent concepts function as conceptual 
metonymies. After all, by mentioning one such inherent concept I may refer to the 
whole concept of which it is a part. In the example, friendship may indicate romantic 
love. This explains why the words girlfriend and boyfriend can be used to talk about 
people who are in a romantic love relationship. Such uses of related concepts can 
be taken to be part for whole metonymies.
Cognitive Models
Following Lakoff (1987), we can think of a category as constituted by a large number 
of members, with some members being central. The mental representation of such 
central members can be given in the form of prototypical cognitive models. Such 
cognitive models can be metaphoric or metonymic.
Emotions are conceptually represented as cognitive models. A particular 
emotion can be represented by means of one or several cognitive models that are 
prototypical of that emotion. This emerges from the Roschean idea that categories 
have a large number of members, one or some of which being prototypical and 
many of which being nonprototypical (see, for example, Rosch 1978). Prototypical 
members of emotion categories are represented by prototypical cognitive models, 
whereas nonprototypical members are represented as deviations from the 
prototypical model (or models). 
The conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, and related concepts all 
converge on such a prototypical model (or models) for particular emotions. Such 
convergence can occur in at least three different ways. In one, the conceptual 
ingredients jointly constitute a cognitive model. In another, they are based on a 
previously existing cognitive model. And in the third, some of them constitute and 
some of them are based on a prototypical cognitive model. In the discussion to 
follow, I will not take sides on this issue (but see Kövecses 2000; 2005).
Prototypical cognitive models can be thought of as folk theories of particular 
emotions (Kövecses 1990). As I have suggested previously (Kövecses 2000), the 
most schematic folk theory of emotions in general can be given as follows:
Cause of emotion → emotion → (controlling emotion → ) response
In other words, we have a very general idea of what emotions are like: There 
are certain causes that lead to emotions, and the emotions we have make us 
produce certain responses. Commonly, there are certain social constraints on 
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which responses are socially acceptable. Societies may impose different sets of 
control mechanisms on emotions. 
This general folk theory of emotions derives from the application of the generic-
level conceptual metaphor causes are forces. The metaphor applies to both the 
first part and the second part of the model. In the model, whatever leads to an 
emotion is conceptualised as a cause that has enough force to effect a change of 
state, and the emotion itself is also seen as a cause that has a force to effect some 
kind of response (physiological, behavioural, and/or expressive). As a matter of 
fact, it is the presence and double application of this generic-level metaphor that 
enables a force-dynamic interpretation of emotional experience.
The Concept of Happiness
The description of the concept of happiness in this section is largely based on 
Kövecses (1991). 
Metaphors of Happiness
The concept of happiness is characterised by a large number and various types 
of conceptual metaphors. Specifically, three types of conceptual metaphor can be 
distinguished: general emotion metaphors, metaphors that provide an evaluation of 
the concept of happiness, and metaphors that provide much of the phenomenological 
nature or character of happiness. The particular conceptual metaphors are given 
below, each with a linguistic example.
General emotion metaphors
happiness is a fluid in a container She was bursting with joy.
happiness is heat/fire Fires of joy were kindled by the birth of her son.
happiness is a natural force I was overwhelmed by joy.
happiness is a physical force He was hit by happiness.
happiness is a social superior They live a life ruled by happiness.
happiness is an opponent She was seized by joy.
happiness is a captive animal All joy broke loose as the kids opened their 
presents.
happiness is insanity The crowd went crazy with joy.
happiness is a force dislocating the self He was beside himself with joy.
happiness is a disease Her good mood was contagious.
Some of the examples may at first sound strange. For example, an anonymous 
reviewer expressed doubts concerning the example given for the captive animal 
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metaphor. But a Google search shows that it can be used of happiness or joy: 
“Then all joy broke loose. The music started, colourful decorations were put up and 
the sanctuary became a place of celebration.”
The conceptual metaphors above are called general  emotion metaphors 
because each applies to some or most emotion concepts, not only to happiness.
Metaphors providing an evaluation of happiness
happiness is light He was beaming with joy.
happiness is feeling light (not heavy) I was floating.
happiness is up I’m feeling up today.
happiness is being in heaven I was in seventh heaven.
Not surprisingly, the metaphors above provide a highly positive evaluation for 
the concept of happiness. Having light, not being weighed down, being up, and 
being in heaven are all very positive, unlike their opposites (dark, being weighed 
down, and being down), which characterise the opposite of happiness: sadness, or 
depression. However, being in hell does not seem to characterise the contemporary 
conception of sadness (Tissari 2008).
Metaphors providing the phenomenological character of happiness
happiness is an animal that lives well I was purring with delight.
happiness is a pleasurable physical sensation I was tickled pink.
happiness is being drunk It was an intoxicating experience.
happiness is vitality He was full of pep.
happiness is warmth What she said made me feel warm all over.
These conceptual metaphors give the feeling tone of happiness, that is, they 
depict the way happiness feels to the person experiencing it. The latter two types of 
conceptual metaphor may be correlated: For example, feeling warmth is normally 
evaluated as a positive experience. 
Conceptual Metonymies of Happiness
The specific conceptual metonymies that apply to happiness correspond to 
behavioural, physiological, and expressive responses, as can be seen below:
Behavioural responses
jumping up and down for happiness
dancing/singing for happiness




increased heart rate for happiness
body warmth for happiness
agitation/excitement for happiness
Expressive responses
bright eyes for happiness
smiling for happiness
Happiness often manifests itself through such behavioural, physiological, and 
expressive responses. We can indicate our own or another person’s happiness by 
making reference to any one of these responses (see, for example, Wierzbicka 
1999). For example, smiling is prototypically taken to be a sign of being happy. 
Furthermore, interestingly, we can find some degree of cultural variation in such 
responses. For example, in Buddhism, happiness is associated with reduced, 
rather than increased, heart rate (suggested by an anonymous reviewer).
Related Concepts
Similar to many other emotion concepts, happiness also consists of several related 





In prototypical cases, happiness assumes being satisfied with a certain outcome. 
Happiness also entails a feeling of pleasure. Finally, when we are happy, we tend 
to feel harmony with the world. 
Prototypical Cognitive Models of Happiness
The theory of cognitive models applies to happiness as a category in the following 
way: The conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, and related concepts 
mentioned above jointly converge on one or several prototypical cognitive models 
of happiness. (The details of this joint convergence are spelled out in Kövecses 
1991 and 2002.) They either constitute the prototypical cognitive model(s) or 
are based on it (them). I suggest that the general concept of happiness is best 
described as having three prototypical cognitive models and many nonprototypical 
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ones clustering around the three prototypes. The three prototypes are happiness 
as an immediate response, happiness as a value, and happiness as being glad.
In other words, the suggestion is that it is these three senses of the word 
happiness that stand out among the many shades and kinds of meaning that 
the word happiness may be used to denote. They seem to be the most salient 
meanings—but, as we will see below, each for a different reason.
Happiness as an Immediate Response
In happiness as an immediate response, a person responds with a form of happiness 
to a desired outcome. The form of happiness that is involved is commonly referred 
to as joy. I do not suggest that this is the only meaning of the word joy (see, for 
instance, Fabiszak 2000, 299–303), but it is the one that I analyse here. This joy/
happiness can be characterised by the following cognitive model.
Cause of joy:
You want to achieve something.
You achieve it.
There is an immediate emotional response to this on your part.
Existence of joy:
You are satisfied.
You display a variety of expressive and behavioural responses including 
brightness of the eyes, smiling, laughing, jumping up and down.
You feel energised.
You also experience physiological responses, including body warmth and 
agitation/excitement.
The context for the state is commonly a social one involving celebrations.
You have a positive outlook on the world.
You feel a need to communicate your feelings to others.
The feeling you have may spread to others.
You experience your state as a pleasurable one.
You feel that you are in harmony with the world.
You can’t help what you feel; you are passive in relation to your feelings.
The intensity of your feelings and experiences is high.
Beyond a certain limit, an increase in intensity implies a social danger for you 
to become dysfunctional, that is, to lose control.
It is not entirely acceptable for you to communicate and/or give free expression 
to what you feel (i.e. to lose control). 
Attempt at control:
Because it is not entirely acceptable to communicate and/or give free expression 
to what you feel, you try to keep the emotion under control: You attempt not 
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to engage in the behavioural responses and/or not to display the expressive 
responses and/or not communicate what you feel.
Loss of control:
You nevertheless lose control.
Action: 
You engage in the behavioural responses and/or display expressive responses 
and/or communicate what you feel. You may, in addition, exhibit wild, uncontrolled 
behaviour (often in the form of dancing, singing, and energetic behaviour with 
a lot of movement).
It is debatable whether the part attempt at control is just as important with happiness 
as with other negative emotions. It seems to me that in Western culture intense forms 
of emotions are in general negatively valued, which would explain the need to control 
even as regards positive emotions. It can certainly be found in romantic love as well 
(Kövecses 1988). However, this topic deserves further investigation.
We can think of the emergence of this model from the metaphors, metonymies, 
and related concepts in the following way: Take, for instance, the idea that when 
we are very happy, there is some loss of control involved. An indicator of this idea 
is given in a number of conceptual metaphors, such as happiness is a natural force, 
happiness is an opponent, happiness is a captive animal, and happiness is insanity. The 
typical linguistic examples of these metaphors suggest that the person who is 
intensely happy is likely to undergo some loss of control (we are overwhelmed, 
we are seized, we go crazy, etc.). Thus, the language we use about happiness 
reveals the way we think about happiness, and the way we think about it is given in 
a prototypical cognitive model. This is the general methodology that I will follow in 
the remainder of the paper.
The immediate response model is a salient one due to its high degree of 
noticeability. It is dominated by highly noticeable behavioural, physiological, and 
expressive responses (i.e., conceptual metonymies) and also by conceptual 
content that is provided by conceptual metaphors suggesting intensity and control, 
leading eventually to a loss of control. This yields happiness as a basic emotion that 
conforms to the general force-dynamic pattern of intense emotional events. Other 
basic emotions have a similar force-dynamic pattern, each with its characteristic 
response profile as reflected in language using conceptual metonymies.
Happiness as a Value
By contrast, happiness as a value is not characterised by a forceful emotion 
interacting with an opposing self. Instead, this form of happiness is constituted by 
a quiet state with hardly any noticeable responses or even a clearly identifiable 
specific cause. (This is why some of its typical vague and general causes are given 
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in parentheses below.) Such a form of happiness is often captured by the following 
conceptual metaphors. 
happiness is light He was beaming with joy.
happiness is feeling light (not heavy) I was floating.
happiness is up I’m feeling up today.
happiness is being in heaven I was in seventh heaven.
happiness is a valuable commodity You can’t buy happiness.
happiness is a desired hidden object At long last I have found happiness.




Happiness is a state that lasts a long time.
It is associated with positive value.
It is a desired state.
It is pleasurable.
It gives you a feeling of harmony with the world.
It is something that you can spread to others.
You have a positive outlook on the world.
It exists separately from you and is outside you.
It is not readily available; it either requires effort to achieve it or comes to you 
from external sources.
It takes a long time to achieve it.
It is just as difficult to maintain as it is to attain.
This is the kind of happiness that comes closest to the one represented by the 
phrase “the pursuit of happiness”, which can also be taken as a linguistic example 
of the happiness is a desired hidden object conceptual metaphor. Normally, happiness 
as a value is not characterised by highly salient emotional responses and a force-
dynamically constituted control aspect. (On the shifts in the use of the word happy, 
see Diller, this volume.) 
Happiness as Being Glad
Happiness as being glad most commonly occurs as a mild positive emotional 
response to a state of affairs that is either not very important to someone or whose 
positive outcome can be taken to be a matter of course. In such a situation, people 
do not produce highly visible responses and do not have to control themselves. We 
can represent this form of happiness in the following way:
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Cause of joy:
You want to achieve something.
You achieve it.




You may exhibit some milder responses like brightness of the eyes and 
smiling.
You may also experience some milder physiological responses like body 
warmth and increased heart rate.
You may have a positive outlook on the world.
You feel that you are in harmony with the world.
This form of happiness is extremely common. We say “I’m glad you came,” 
but we are not led to intense emotional responses and we do not have to struggle 
(for control) with the emotion we feel. It is the very commonness of such a form of 
happiness that makes it salient, and hence prototypical.
Conclusions
In light of the preceding analysis of happiness, it seems reasonable to draw the 
following conclusions. 
First, I suggested that the conceptual structure of happiness/joy can be usefully 
described in terms of four cognitive components: conceptual metaphors, conceptual 
metonymies, related concepts, and cognitive/cultural models. It is the cognitive/
cultural models that can be thought of as cognitive representations of the concept. 
Three of these have been identified for happiness/joy: happiness as an immediate 
response, happiness as a value, and happiness as being glad.
Second, the concept of happiness/joy shares a number of force-dynamic 
metaphorical source domains with emotion concepts in general, as well as many 
nonemotional concepts within the scope of these source domains. This suggests 
a great deal of similarity in the structure of a large number of concepts that do not 
belong to the same general area of experience.
Third, a new finding of this paper is that happiness/joy and emotion concepts in 
general are characterised by what I have called evaluative and phenomenological 
metaphors. Evaluative metaphors provide a particular appraisal for happiness, 
while  phenomenological metaphors describe its phenomenological character.
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Fourth, phenomenological metaphors seem to be based on the distinctive 
causes and expressive, physiological and behavioural responses that characterise 
happiness. For metaphorical conceptualisation to be based on distinctive causes 
and effects associated with a concept seems to be a general property of our 
cognitive apparatus.
Fifth, a top-down approach can provide us with a fairly detailed though very 
tentative overall cognitive structure for concepts. It is clear that a top-down approach 
needs to be supplemented by a bottom-up approach (including, e.g., corpus linguistic 
studies) for a fuller, more detailed, and more precise characterisation of prototypes 
of happiness, and very likely, for that of many other concepts. The challenge that 
lies before us is to combine the two approaches to the mutual satisfaction of both 
researchers who work top-down and researchers who work bottom-up. 
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